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Consumer Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp.'—Section 4 of the Clayton Act 2
 provides that "any person ... injured in
his business or property" by an antitrust violation may bring an action for
treble damages. Until the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 3
 there was a general assumption,
reflected in judicial opinions' and learned commentary,' that section 4 pro-
' 579 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1978), rehearing en bane denied, 579 F.2d 1077, cert.
granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3449 (Jan. 9, 1979).
2
 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
• 579 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1978), rehearing en bane denied, 579 F.2d 1077, cert.
i„ri-anted, 47 U.S.L.W. '3449 (Jan. 9, 1979).
• Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. '308. 313-14 (1978) ("Clearly,
therefore, Congress did not intend 10 make the treble-damages remedy available only
to consumers in our own country." (footnote omitted)); Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat., Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977) ("The discussions of this section on the floor
of the Senate indicate that it was conceived of primarily as a remedy for Itlhe people
of the United States as individuals,' especially consumers."); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.
of Cal., 405 U.S. 251. 264 (1972) ("A large and ultimately undeterminable part of the
injury to the 'general economy' ... is no more than a reflection of injuries to the 'busi-
ness or property' of consumers, for which they may recover themselves under § 4.");
Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 99 n.23 (3d Cir.), rehearing
denied, 552 F.2d 90, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977) ("The right of consumers to
challenge price fixing conspiracies is well established."); Theophil v. Sheller-Globe
Corp., 446 F. Supp. 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (retail purchasers of motor homes allowed to
sue manufacturers); DeGregorio v. Segal, 443 F. Supp. 1257 (F.D. Pa. 1978) (persons
denied admission to nursing homes because of alleged conspiracy among nursing
home owners to fix prices for care of indigents could sue under § 4 for loss of social
security income exemptions); In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum
Products Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Gas. 11 61,639 (C.D. Cal. 1977).  (consumers
of gasoline products could sue for overcharges); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation,
1977-1 Trade Cas. 11 61,434 (D.D.C. 1977) (consumers could sue drug manufacturers
for overcharges). See Hanover Shoe, Inc., v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.. 392 U.S. 481,
494 (1968) (the Court suggests that "ultimate consumers" have a cause of action under
§ 4); Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. America, Inc., 550 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 933 (1977) (class action involving consumers as plaintiffs currently going for-
ward in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as a result of the Third Circuit ruling);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (class of all odd-lot purchas-
ers of stock certified as a class of proper plaintiffs); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer &
Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (consumers allowed to share in settlement of
price fixing case). Contra Weinberg v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 880
(N.D. Cal. 1977); Gutierrez v. E. & J. Gallo Winery Co., Inc., 425 F. Stipp. 1221 (N.D.
Cal. 1977); Smith v. Toyota Motor Sales, 1977-I Trade Cas. 1i 61,251 (N.D. Cal, 1977),
appeals docketed, Nos. 77-1845, 77-1724, 77-1725, 77-1850, 77-1851, 77-1852 (9th Cir.
1977) (consumers not allowed to sue because they lacked injury to "business or com-
mercial interest").
'S
	 SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 771 (1977) ("By and large, any injury to financial
interests, including those to a consumer which must pay more for a product because of
a violation, have been held to be compensable." (footnote omitted)); f I P. AREEnA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 11 337a, at 183 (1978) ("Whether or not engaged in 'business'
in any layman's sense, the ultimate consumer victimized by an antitrust violation is
'injured in his business or property' within the meaning of Clayton Act § 4 and there-
fore has standing to recover treble damages.").
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vided consumers as well as businesses with a right to recover damages result-
ing from antitrust. violations. The court in Reiter, however, held that to be
"injured in his business or property" within the meaning of section 4, a plain-
tiff must suffer injury "of a commercial or competitive nature," and that an
overcharge for a nonbusiness purchase does not constitute such an injury."
The plaintiffs in Reiter, the class of all purchasers of hearing aids for
personal use in the United States, sued five manufacturers of hearing aids for
treble damages. The plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturers had engaged in
resale price maintenance by•conspiring illegally to control the prices at which
independent dealers sold hearing aids. 9 The defendants moved for dismissal
or summary judgment," arguing that as consumers the plaintiffs were not
injured in their "business or property," and thus lacked standing" to sue for
treble damages under section 4) 2 The federal district court denied the de-
fendants' motions, holding that the plaintiffs did have standing. The court
nevertheless agreed to certify the issue of consumer standing for interlocutory
review.' 3
A two judge panel" of the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court,
agreeing with the defendants that the plaintiffs had not been injured in their
"business or property." 15
 The court held that injury in one's "property,"
within the meaning of section 4, requires "injury of a commercial or competi-
tive nature."' Thus, because the plaintiffs could allege no commercial or
6
 The word "consumer," as used hereafter in this article, refers to purchasers
at the final link in the chain of distribution who purchase items fir personal, nonbusi-
ness use.
' 579 F.2d at 1087.
8 Id. at 1079.
9 Id. at 1078. Resale price maintenance is an agreement between a seller and
its buyer fixing the price at which the buyer may resell the product and is a per se
violation of § 1of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). United States v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
" 579 F.2d at 1078. The plaintiffs' standing to sue for injunctive relief under
§ 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), was not at issue. Section 16 provides
that any person threatened with loss or damage by reason of a violation of the anti-
trust laws may obtain injunctive relief,
" "Standing" as used herein refers not to standing as that term is used in
connection with Article III of the United States Constitution, but to the right to sue
for damages which was created by Congress in enacting § 4 of the Clayton Act. To
have § 4 "standing," a plaintiff must meet several requirements: (1) he must suffer
injury to his business or property, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203
U.S. 390, 396 (1906); (2) he must suffer an injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977); (3) there must be a direct causal connection between the defendant's violation
and the plaintiff's injury, Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910);
and (4) the injury must flow from that which makes the defendant's conduct unlawful,
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., supra. 11 P. AREEDA & 1). TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 1 1 334 (1978); L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 770-74 (1977).
579 F.2d at 1078.
13
 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 435 F. Stipp. 933, 938 (D. Minn. 1977).
14
 The case was decided by judges Bright and Henley. judge Webster partici-
pated in oral argument, but not in the disposition of the case. 579 F.2d at 1078 n.*.
'' 579 F.2d at 1079.
'" Id. at 1087.
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competitive injury, they could not claim an injury in their property. Further-
more, because the plaintiffs were not in business, they clearly could allege no
injury in their business. Accordingly, the court. of appeals dismissed their
complaint.
The court of appeals based its holding that consumers should not be al-
lowed to sue under section 4 on its interpretation of the legislative history of
that section, on prior decisions construing the phrase "business or property,"
on its conclusion that denial of standing to consumers was not inconsistent.
with the purposes of the Antitrust Improvements Act of l976,' 7 and on its
prediction of the effect consumer suits would have on competition. The court
looked first to the legislative history of section 4. Although it recognized that
the Supreme Court has characterized the legislative history as "not very in-
structive"' "
 regarding the purpose of the "business or property" requirement,
the court gave considerable weight to the legislative history. In particular, the
court relied on the change which occurred in the language of section 4 during
the course of legislative drafting. As originally proposed, section 4 allowed
"any person or corporation injured or damnified" to sue.'" The version of
section 4 which was finally adopted, by contrast, allowed "[a]ny person injured
in his business or property to sue."'" The addition of the "business or prop-
erty" langauge, the Reiter court. concluded, showed a congressional intent to
limit the class permitted to sue, with the result that consumers were
excluded."
The court. found further evidence of a legislative intent to exclude con-
sumers in the remarks of congressmen who emphasized their desire to protect
small business from the predatory practices of large businesses, but who did
not. mention consumers.'" The court focused on Senator George's remark
that the provision would be of little practical help to "the poor man, the con-
sumer, the laborer, the farmer, the mechanic, the country tnerchant.. .." 2 "
The court in Reiter presumably concluded that. the legislators' discussion of
the statute's benefits 10 small businessmen, but not the benefits to consumers,
demonstrated that they did not intend to provide consumers with a right to
sue for damages.
After considering the legislative history, the court. turned to judicial deci-
sions construing the phrase "business or property." While no other court of
appeals had considered the question whether consumers are injured in their
property, the court examined opinions discussing the meaning of "business or
property" in other contexts. The court interpreted these cases to require that.
a plaintiff sustain a "commercial or competitive injury" in order to sue under
section 4 of the Clayton Act. 24
Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
'" 579 12 .2d at 1080.
E" S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.
	
2 (1889).
211
 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); 579 F.2(1 at 1079-80.
21 Id. at 1080.
22
 Id. at 1 080-81.
21
 Id. at 1080.
24
 Id. at 1084.
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The court then examined the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 25
which allows state attorneys general to sue for damages suffered by state resi-
dents because of antitrust violations. The court noted that the legislative his-
tory of the 1976 Act indicated that the legislators believed that consumers had
standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act." But, the court also observed
that the opinions of legislators in 1976.  could shed no light on the meaning of
"business or property" as used by their predecessors in 1890. 27 Since Con-
gress did not intend to "create new substantive liability" 28 by enacting the
1976 Improvements Act, its desire to provide consumers with a parens patriae
remedy could not, in the court's view, alter the fact that section 4 does not
provide a consumer remedy.
Finally, the court turned to the practical impact of consumer suits under
section 4 of the Clayton Act. The court conjectured that allowing consumers
to sue might "preserve an oligopolistic economic climate."" If consumers
were allowed to sue, businesses would have to settle consumer class actions.
The expense of settling these claims, the court concluded, might cause small
firms, but not large ones, to go out of business. 30 This latter part of the
opinion shows that. the court was concerned with the effect its decision would
have on competition. Nevertheless, the court's denial of standing to consum-
ers means that antitrust. violators who sell to consumers, rather than to
businesses, can pursue their anticompetitive practices undeterred by the threat
of treble damage suits.
Suits under section 4 by private parties, such as the plaintiffs in Reiter, are
vital to the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws." The Justice De-
partment and the Federal Trade Commission, the two federal agencies
charged with the primary responsibility for enforcing these laws, lack the re-
sources for comprehensive prosecution of antitrust violations. Furthermore,
the sanctions imposed by successful government suits—jail sentences, fines,
and injunctions—are often insufficient to deter violations. 32 By contrast, the
25
 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
2" 579 F.2c1 at 1085.
27 Id.
214 id.
2" Id. at 1086.
30 Id .
'I' See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494
(1968); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977). Cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (private suits a "bulwark" of antitrust enforce-
ment).
"2 As the Senate Majority Report for the Antitrust. Enforcement Act of 1978
noted:
The task of enforcement. of this Nation's antitrust laws is of course
shared between private damage actions, and public enforcement actions by
the justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission. The Antitrust.
Division can bring a civil or criminal action. Sanctions in these type of cases
include jail sentences, fines, and injunctions. However, fines and jail sen-
tences, even the substantially increased ones now in effect, are simply not
enough to deter conduct which can potentially reap millions upon millions
of dollars. As one businessman said:
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risk of a substantial treble damage recovery by a private party suing under
section 4 is a powerful deterrent. 33 By foreclosing the possibility of a con-
sumer action under section 4, Reiter weakens this deterrent and precludes
consumers from recovering damages for illegal overcharges. Thus, the pri-
mary impact of the Reiter decision is anticompetitive.
This casenote will analyze consumers' standing to sue for damages when
they are overcharged clue to antitrust violations. First, the language of section
4 and the pre -Reiter case law construing it will be examined to see if they
support the Reiter court's conclusion that. consumers are not injured "in their
property." The casenote then will consider three Supreme Court opinions,
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.," Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 35
and Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 36 in which the Court was called on
to decide what kinds of plaintiffs can recover treble damages under section 4.
The policy considerations which motivated the Court in these decisions will be
isolated and these considerations will be applied to the question whether con-
sumers should be allowed to sue. Finally, the impact of Reiter on the Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976" will be considered. It will be submitted that the
court in Reiter misconstrued existing case law in holding that the plaintiffs had
not been injured "in their property," that the policies underlying the Supreme
Court's decisions in Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, and Hawaii are best served by
allowing consumers to recover damages for violations of the antitrust laws,
and that Reiter effectively nullifies the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.
When you're doing $30 million a year and stand to gain $3 million
by fixing prices, a $30,000 fine doesn't mean much. Face it, most of us
would be willing to spend 30 days in jail to make a few extra million
dollars. [Business Week, June 2, 1976].
S. REP. No. 934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978) (quoting from the testimony of John
Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust before the Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary), reprinted in CCH
Trade Regulation Reports No. 339, Part 11, at 18 (June 6, 1978).
The Senate Majority Report referred to in note 32 supra, also indicated that:
A successful damage action, on the other hand, can result in a trebling
of the actual damage. The risk of such substantial liability and its direct
relationship to the illegal profits of the wrongful conduct makes a
businessman think long and hard before initiating or participating in a
course of conduct possibly violative of the antitrust laws. The head of the
Antitrust Division, John Shenefield, testified that:
As a former private antitrust lawyer, I am personally familiar with
the fact that private treble damage liability is• taken very seriously in-
deed by businesses—sometimes more seriously even than the possibility
of prosecution. [Hearings at 18.]
S. REP. No. 934, 95th Cong, 2d Sess. 18 (1978), reprinted in CCH Trade Regulation
Reports No. 339, Part II, at 18 (June 6, 1978).
34
 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
35 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
36
 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
37 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
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I. CONSTRUCTION OF "BUSINESS OR PROPERTY" REQUIREMENT
In construing statutes, courts normally look to legislative history to dis-
cover what meaning the drafters attached to the words they used. If the
drafters' meaning is unclear, courts must infer their meaning from the pur-
pose of the statute. The Supreme Court has said that the legislative history is
inconclusive as to the meaning of the "business or property" requirement in
section 4.38 However, the Court has found the legislative history instructive
as to the primary purpose of section 4. As the Court has stated, "[t]he discus-
sions of this section on the floor of the Senate indicate that it was conceived of
primarily as a remedy for '[t]he people of the United States as individuals,'
especially consumers." 3 "
Despite this finding by the Supreme Court that section 4 was intended to
help consumers, the court in Reiter interpreted the words "in his business or
property" as excluding consumers from the class permitted to sue. There are
several problems with this interpretation. First, the only support the court
cites for this theory is the comment of one senator that the bill ought not to
be a litigation breeder." The court produced no evidence, however, that
Congress intended the "business or property" restriction to serve a purpose
other than to exclude those injuries unrelated to the purchase and sale of
goods and services. Second, the court in Reiler thought that. the legislators'
IN Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972).
39 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977)
*quoting 21 CONG. REC. 1767-68 (1890)). The quotation above was taken from an in-
teresting footnote which reads as follows:
Treble-damages antitrust actions were first authorized by § 7 of the Sher-
man Act, '26 Stat. 210 (1890). The discussions of this section on the floor of"
the Senate indicate that it was conceived of primarily as a remedy for "[Ole
people of the United States as individuals," especially consumers. Treble
damages were provided in part for punitive purposes, but also to make the
remedy meaningful by counterbalancing "the difficulty of maintaining a
private suit against a combination such as is described" in the Act.
When Congress enacted the Clayton Act in 1914, it "extend[ed] the
remedy under section 7 of the Sherman Act" to persons injured by virtue
of any antitrust violation. The initial House debates concerning provisions
related to private damages actions reveal that these actions were conceived
primarily as "open[ing,] the door of justice to every man, whenever he may
be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws, and giv[ing] the injured
party ample damages for the wrong suffered." The House debates follow-
ing the conference committee report, however, indicate that the sponsors
of the bill also saw treble-damages suits as an important means of enforc-
ing the law. In the Senate there was virtually no discussion of the enforce-
ment value of private actions, even though the bill was attacked as lacking
meaningful sanctions
Id. (citations omitted). See also Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9
J. LAW' & ECON. 7, 10 (1966) ("The legislative history, in fact, contains no colorable
suppori for application by courts of any value premise or policy other than the
maximization of consumer welfare.").
4" 579 F.2d at 1080.
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recognition that the bill might help businesses more than individuals implied
that Congress did not intend to allow consumers to sue.'" Yet, as the court
itself recognized, the legislators' remarks were directed at "practical rather
than theoretical" obstacles to consumer suits. 42 Consumers, at the time the
act was passed, were unlikely to sue because their individual damages usually
were too small to justify a lawsuit. Since the act was passed before the advent,
of the class action, individual damage suits were the only available remedy for
overcharged consumers. 4" The court's reasoning that, since the drafters of
section 4 realized consumers probably could not sue, they did not intend to
allow consumers to sue, is perplexing. The words the legislators chose, "in-
jured in his business or property," certainly indicate a desire to include a
broader class than those injured in their business. Moreover, as the Supreme
Court has already found, the legislative history indicates that section 4 was
intended "as a remedy for Itihe people of the United States as individuals,'
especially consumers." 44
Perhaps the most serious objections to the court's decision in Reiter is its
misunderstanding of other cases interpreting the phrase "business or prop-
erty." The pre-Reiter case law strongly supports the proposition that, consum-
ers have standing to sue under section 4. The courts that have considered the
meaning of this phrase have agreed that "property," as used in section 4,
refers to something separate and distinct from business interests.
The first and most significant. in the line of cases interpreting the "busi-
ness or property" requirement, Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. City of
Atlanta,'" provides clear support for the proposition that overcharged con-
sumers are injured "in their property." In Chattanooga, the city of Atlanta
alleged that it had been overcharged in its purchases of pipe for the city
waterworks by a trust which misled the city into paying "a price much above
what was reasonable or the pipe was worth."'" Justice Holmes, writing for
the majority of the Supreme Court, stated that regardless whether the city
4r
 Ir1. at 1081.
42 Id. at 1080 n.6.
" Judge Larson, writing the district court opinion in Reiter, attributed the lack
of extensive discussion of consumers in the legislative history to the context in which
the debates took place:
Regardless of the conclusions one draws from a literal reading of the legis-
lative history, the debates must be read in light of the knowledge and as-
sumptions held by society in that period. In 1914,
   when the Clayton Act
was passed to incorporate and extend the Sherman Act, "consumers" were
not identifiable as a constituency, and protection of their economic in-
terests was an unknown concept. If they were not discussed at any great
length during congressional consideration of the antitrust statutes, it. is at
least as probable that they did not exist in the minds of Congressmen as
that they were deliberately ignored.
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 435 F. Stipp. 933, 937 (I). Minn, 1977) (citation omitted),
44
 See note 39 supra.
4.5
	U.S. 390 (1906). See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 771 n.3 (1977), for a
discussion of Justice Holmes' interpretation of "business ()I - property" in Chattanooga.
46
 203 U.S. at 395.
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had been injured in its business of furnishing water, it had been injured in its
property." Justice Holmes observed that "[a] person whose property is di-
minished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in his prop-
erty .... The damage complained of must almost or quite always be damage in
property, that is, in the money of the plaintiff' ...."" "Business" and "prop-
erty," then, were separate and distinct interests. The Court did not decide
whether the city was "in business," and if so, whether it had been injured in
its business, because the Court concluded that. the city's property injury was
sufficient to enable' it to sue under section 4.
In Reiter, the Eighth Circuit briefly considered Chattanooga.'" The court
observed that "the city's claim [in Chattanooga] arguably sought recovery for a
business injury." 5° This observation ignores, however, justice Holmes' state-
ment that the city could recover solely for injury in its property, without any
reference to its business. The Reiter court thus missed the essential thrust of
Chattanooga, and this misapprehension contributed to its ultimate holding that
consumers are not injured in their property.
Other decisions have followed the Chattanooga interpretation of "business
or property"—that overcharged consumers may'suffer a property injury even
though they are not in business. In Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 5 ' the
plaintiff, who had contracted for the importation and sale of Iranian oil,"
alleged that the defendants had conspired to prevent the sales from taking
place.53 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that the plaintiff had not established a business injury because he
had been deprived of future, rather than current sales; in other words, his
"business" had not begun at the time of the injury. 54 Nevertheless, the dis-
trict court held that his contract for future sales was "property," within the
meaning of section 4, which was injured by the defendants' alleged conspir-
acy." In explaining its holding, the court stated:
The statute explicitly uses the words "business or property" in the
disjunctive. Congress intended this distinction to be meaningful. The
word "property" has wider scope and is more extensive than the
word "business." Less is required to prove "property" than to prove
"business.""
Thus, Waldron lends support to the theory that one need not be in business to
suffer a section 4 property injury.
In another case supporting this theory, Cleary v. Chalk, 57 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that passengers
4'
	 at 396.
48 Id. at 396-97.
49 579 F.2d at 1082.
•so Id.
" 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
52 Id. at 78.
53 Id. at 75.
" Id. at 83.
55 Id. at 86.
56 Id. at 86 (footnote omitted).
57 488 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974).
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of a transit company whose fares were increased clue to alleged antitrust viola-
tions were injured in their "property."' Citing Chattanooga, the court stated
that "[Ole who in a business transaction purchases an article is 'injured in
[his] property' when he is 'led to pay more than the worth of the' article.'
The court noted that the plaintiffs, regular fare-paying riders,"" stated a suffi-
cient allegation of injury to business or property."' In the view of the Cleary
court, one who pays for goods or services participates in a "business transac-
tion," 62
 even if he is not. "in business," and is injured in his property when
overcharged.
Chattanooga, Waldron, and Cleary suggest that one need not be in business
to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act." In contrast, the Eighth Circuit,
which decided Reiter, requires that a plaintiff be in business to maintain an
action for damages under section 4. The Eighth Circuit apparently so held in
Ragar v. T.J. Raney & Sons," although there were alternative grounds for the
decision." In Ragar, a group of property owners contended that an alleged
conspiracy by investment banking firms to fix municipal bond interest rates
injured them by raising their real estate taxes."" The court held that the
plaintiffs lacked a significant causal connection to the defendants' offense be-
cause the municipality, rather than the property owners, had been directly
injured.''? The court also held that the plaintiff's lacked a "business or prop-
58
 488 F.2d at 1319 n.17.
3" Id.
" Id. at 1318.
" Id. at 1319 n.17.
62 Id.
63 See Congress Building Corp. v. Loew's, Inc.. 246 F.2d 587. 594, rehearing
denied, 246 F.2d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 1957) ("The defendants herein contend that, 'Once
the lease had been executed, plaintiff's 'business' of leasing ceased.' We do not think it
necessary to consider this 'argument,' for we think it clear that plaintiff was injured in
its property. 'A man is injured in his property when his property is diminished.' '');
State of Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 299 F. Supp. 596, 604 (D. Minn. 1969)
("Yet, as a practical matter, a suit by a governmental claimant who is a purchaser not
engaged in business for profit is probably limited to the increased costs theory of
damages.... Mr. justice Holmes established the aforegoing principle by stating that 'a
person whose property is diminished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is
injured in its property.' "); Utah Gas Pipelines Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 233 F.
Supp. 955, 964 (D. Utah 1964) ("Even though there were no 'business' subject to in-
jury, injury to plaintiff's property would be actionable if otherwise a basis of liability
existed.").
" 4
 388 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (E.D. Ark. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 521 F.2d 795
(8th Cir. 1975).
"' 388 F. Supp. at 1187.
6" hi. at 1185.
" Id. at 1187. Some courts have required that a plaintiff be "directly injured"
by an antitrust violation to have § 4 standing. E.g., liravman v. Bassett Furniture In-
dus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 97, rehearing denied, 552 F.2c1 90 (3d Cir. 1977);. Reibert v.
Atlantic Richfield Co.. 421 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973);
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910).
Other courts have required that the plaintiff be within the target area of the de-
fendant's violation, that is, "within that area of the economy which is endangered by a
448	 ROSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 (Vol. 20:439
erty" injury. The court said that. to have been injured in their business or
property, the plaintiffs must have suffered a "competitive injury to their
businesses due to the activities of the defendants.""
The court in Reiter relied on Ragar in formulating its requirement of
"commercial or competitive injury." Yet, the Ragar court never explained
what it meant by "competitive injury." Cleary, Waldron, and Chattanooga
suggest, however, that a plaintiff need not. be
 in business in order to sue
under section 4. It is also well established that a plaintiff alleging a property
injury need not suffer a diminished ability to compete in order to have section
4 standing. In Chattanooga, the city was not competing with businesses to sup-
ply water to its citizens, yet the Court held that it was injured in its property.
The bus passengers in Cleary were not competing, yet they, too, were held to
have alleged an injury in their property. In ruling that only business injuries
are compensable under section 4, the Eighth Circuit in Reiter lost sight of the
principle justice Holmes enunciated in Chattanooga: " A person whose property
is diminished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in his
property.""" Chattanooga and the decisions which rely on it compel the con-
clusion that consumers such as the plaintiffs in Reiter are injured in their
property when they are overcharged due to antitrust violations. Since neither
the language of section 4 nor the judicial opinions construing this language
bar consumer suits,'" the question becomes whether there is any valid policy
reason for denying standing to consumers.
11. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In deciding which persons should recover damages under section 4, the
Supreme Court has attempted to promote effective private enforcement of
breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry." Conference of Studio
Unions v. Locw's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919
(1952).
"6
 388 F. Stipp. at 1187.
"" 203 U.S. at 396.
7" In construing the language of 4, the Supreme Court. has been guided by
the broad purposes of that section, i.e., compensation of persons injured by antitrust
violations arid deterrence of further violations. Thus, when the Court was asked to
decide whether foreign governments were "persons" within the meaning of § 4, justice
Stewart observed that, "Din light of the law's expansive remedial purpose, the Court
has not taken a technical or semantic approach in determining who is a 'person' enti-
tled to sue for treble damages." Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313
(1978). This suggests that the Court would also disapprove of a technical or semantic
approach in determining who is injured in his property within the meaning of § 4 and
would look to the broad purposes of the section in determining whether consumers
are injured in their property.
the Pfizer opinion is also noteworthy for its comment that Itireble-damages suits
by ii.ireigners who have been victimized by antitrust violations clearly may contribute to
the protection of American consumers." 434 U.S. at 314. The anomaly of denying
standing to American consumers becomes apparent when it is deemed necessary to
protect them indirectly by allowing foreign governments standing to sue for treble
damages. It is ironic that the Pfizer Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's en bane hold-
ing which allowed standing to foreign governments, 550 F.2d 396, and then this same
circuit denied standing to American consumers when it decided Reiter.
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the antitrust laws while avoiding duplicative recoveries and undue com-
plexities of proof. The opinions in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machin-
ery,'' Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 72
 and Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California 73
illustrate the Court's use of these criteria.
In Hanover Shoe, a shoe machinery supplier argued that it was not liable
for overcharging shoe manufacturers because the shoe manufacturers had
passed the overcharges on to their customers and thus had not been in-
jured." The Court held that the machinery supplier could not avoid liability
by showing that the shoe manufacturers had offset their damages by charging
higher prices fOr shoes." The Court's decision allowed the shoe manufactur-
ers to recover damages which they in fact may not have suffered. In rejecting
the machinery suppliers' "passing on" defense, the Court reasoned that allow-
ing the defense would hinder antitrust enforcement for two reasons. First, the
"passing on" defense would involve lengthy and complicated trials and almost
insurmountable obstacles for plaintiffs who purchase directly from price-
fixers.'" If the "passing on" defense is not permitted, the plaintiff's damages
are simply the amount he was overcharged; however, if the "passing on" de-
fense is permitted, the plaintiff's damages are the difference between his
prices, sales, and profits with the overcharge, and his prices, sales, and profits
if there had been no overcharge. Calculation of what the plaintiff's prices,
sales, and profits would have been without the overcharge depends on the
elasticity of demand for his goods." Proof of elasticity of demand is difficult
and time-consuming. 78
 Therefore, if the "passing on" defense is allowed and
the issue of elasticity of demand enters into the calculation of damages, the
length and complexity of trials would increase significantly. Recognizing this,
the Hanover Shoe Court refused to allow a defendant to reduce his liability by
proving that the plaintiff passed on the defendant's overcharges to his cus-
tome rs. 79
The Court's second reason for rejecting the "passing on" defense was the
fear that "those who violate the antitrust laws by price-fixing or monopolizing
71
 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
72
 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
7"
 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
74
 392 U.S. at 488.
75 Id. at 494, In disallowing the passing on defense, the Court cited Chat-
tanooga and stated that, "tais long as the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he
takes from the buyer more than the law allows." Id. at 489.
7"
 Id. at 493.
" If the elasticity of demand for a good is high, a small increase in its price
will cause consumers to decrease their purchases of the good significantly. Thus, if the
seller of such goods has been forced to increase his price because his seller over-
charged hitn, he may be damaged by a severe decline in his sales, and thus his profits,
despite the fact that he is "passing on" the overcharge. Conversely, if demand for the
seller's product is relatively inelastic, his sales volume would remain stable despite a
price increase, and thus he would not be damaged as much by his supplier's over-
charges. See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 787 (1977).
78 Id.
7 " 392 U.S. at 493.
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would retain the fruits of their illegality because no one was available who
would bring suit against them." 8 " The Court reasoned that if the "passing
on" defense were used throughout the chain of distribution, the cause of ac-
tion would rest finally with the ultimate consumers, whose interest in a lawsuit
is minimal clue to the small amounts of their individual damages."t Thus, the
Court wanted to promote private enforcement by allowing the parties with the
largest stake in the outcome to sue.
The same considerations that motivated the Court in Hanover Shoe to re-
ject the "passing on" defense—the desire to avoid lengthy, complicated trials
and to ensure defendants could not retain the fruits of their illegality—also
arose in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. The issue in Illinois Brick was whether a
plaintiff could use "passing on" as an offensive theory of recovery. The plain-
tiffs, the state of Illinois and 700 local governmental entities, sued the man-
ufacturers of concrete blocks, alleging that they had overcharged masonry
contractors who in turn had passed their overcharges on to general construc-
tion contractors who then had passed their overcharges on to the plaintiffs."
Thus, in Illinois Brick the plaintiffs used "passing on" to create their dam-
ages, whereas in Hanover Shoe the defendants attempted to use "passing on" to
reduce the plaintiffs' damages.
The Court in Illinois Brick again disapproved the use of the "passing on"
theory," holding that the indirect purchasers would not be permitted to sue.
Like the Court in Hanover Shoe, the Court in Illinois Brick was concerned with
the difficulty of proving a "passing on" theory of damages. 84 The trial of a
case like Illinois Brick would be even more lengthy and complex than a case
like Hanover Shoe because a plaintiff who purchased the product several steps
down the chain of distribution would have to prove how much of the over-
charge was passed on at each step -in the chain. In contrast, a defendant using
"passing on" as a defense would only need to show how much of the over-
charge the plaintiff who purchased from him had passed on; thus, only one
step in the chain would be involved."
In Illinois Brick, the Court also wanted to ensure that the antitrust laws
would be effectively enforced by private damage actions." It reasoned that
allowing direct purchasers to recover the full amount of an overcharge would
motivate these purchasers to sue. In contrast, if indirect purchasers, as well as
direct purchasers, were allowed to sue, the potential recovery for each would
be smaller and the probability that anyone would sue would be correspond-
ingly reduced. 87 Another factor in the Illinois Brick decision was the possibil-
8" Id. at 494.
8 ' Id. The Court was referring to the lack of incentive for consumers to sue
because their damages are relatively small, not to any lack of standing on the part of'
consumers. Id.
82
 431 U.S. at 726.
83
 Id. at 736.
84
 Id. at 732.
85 Id. at 732-33.
H 8
 Id. at 745.
87 hi. at 745-46. Like the Hanover Shoe Court, the Illinois Brick Court based this
conclusion "on the judgment that the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced
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ity that defendants would incur multiple liability if the Court permitted offen-
sive but not defensive, use of the "passing on" theory. 88 An indirect pur-
chaser could recover for all or part of an overcharge that was passed on to it,
and a direct purchaser could recover from the same defendant the full
amount of the overcharge."
Thus, the considerations underlying the Illinois Brick decision were the
promotion of private enforcement, the avoidance of complexities of proof,
and the prevention of duplicative recoveries. These same considerations were
also present in a case decided prior to Illinois Brick, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.
of California. 9° In Hawaii, the Court denied parens patriae standing to the state
of Hawaii suing on behalf of its citizens who allegedly were overcharged be-
cause of price-fixing.• Allowing the state to recover damages on behalf of its
citizens, the Court reasoned, could lead to duplicative recoveries since the citi-
zens also could recover individually for injuries to their business or prop-
erty." Thus, a defendant might have to pay twice for the same offense--
once to the state and once to the individual citizen.'" Although the state
claimed that its "general economy" was injured, the Court held that some of
this injury was indistinguishable from injury to individual "business or prop-
erty." The Court reasoned that "[a] large and ultimately indeterminable part
of the injury to the 'general economy,' as it is measured by economists, is no
more than a reflection of injuries to the 'business or property' of consumers
for which they may recover themselves under § 4." 94
Like the Court in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, the Court in Hawaii
recognized the importance of private suits in preventing antitrust violators
from retaining the fruits of their illegality. The state argued that "denying
Hawaii the right to sue for injury to her quasi-sovereign interests will allow
antitrust violations to go virtually unremecliecl."" 5 The Court, however, re-
by concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather
than by allowing every plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to sue only for
the amount it could show was absorbed by it." Id. at 735.
The court in Reiler correctly declined to base its decision on Illinois Brick. 579 F.2d
at 1079 n.3. While Illinois Brick held that, where overcharges are alleged to have been
passed on, only the direct purchaser may sue the violator, and the plaintiffs in Reiler
were not direct purchasers from the violators, Reiter is distinguishable because it in-
volved resale price maintenance. Thus, no "passing on" of overcharges was alleged,
but rather it was claimed that the retailers who sold to the plaintiffs were selling at
higher prices determined by the manufacturers. The Court in Illinois Brick explained
that indirect purchasers could sue in situations in which market forces have been
superseded [as when] the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer." 431
U.S. at 736 n.16.
" 431 U.S. at 730.
811 Id.
"" 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
" 1 Id. at '252-53.
" 2 Id. at 265.
" 3 Id. at 263. "[Section 4] gives the same right to every citizen of Hawaii with
respect to any damage to business or property." Id.
"4 Id. at 264.
"5 Id. at 265.
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jetted this argument and emphasized the enforcement potential of class ac-
tions by private citizens. 9" Since these actions were available, the Court was
unpersuaded that its barring of parens patriae suits would seriously hinder en-
. forcement of' the antitrust laws."
The Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, and Hawaii dem-
onstrated its concern for the availability of private antitrust enforcers. Its
primary goal was to ensure that private plaintiffs can and do sue antitrust.
violators. In Hanover Shoe, the Court refused to allow the "passing on" defense
because use of the defense would preclude all but remote purchasers, who
were unlikely to sue, from prosecuting the violator. In Illinois Brick, the Court
prohibited the offensive use 'of "passing on" because this would divide the
damages among direct and indirect purchasers, thus reducing the incentive of
any of these parties to sue. In Hawaii, the Court recognized the importance of
private enforcement and stated that this goal was adequately served by class
actions and thus parens palriae suits would be superfluous. Because of the
Court's overriding concern with promoting private enforcement of the anti-
trust laws," the Court has barred suits only where they would have serious
96 Id. at 266. Despite the fact that the issue of consumer standing was not
before the Court in Hawaii, the Reiter court placed a great deal of emphasis on the
comment in Hawaii that the words "business or property" refer to "commercial in-
terests or enterprises." 579 F.2d at 1083 (citing 405 U.S. at 264). This reliance is mis-
placed because a consumer's interest in paying a reasonable price is a "commercial
interest." Professor Sullivan writes:
The [Hawaii] Court was not contrasting business with consumer interests,
but was contrasting matters of commerce generally with the interest of a
state in vindicating injuries to its general economy. In context, the phrase
"commercial interests," used by the Court, is broad enough to include any
injury to a consumer who, making a purchase in commerce, suffers an
injury "in his *** property." This conclusion is reinforced by other parts of
the opinion in Hawaii. For one thing, the Court makes clear that a state
can recover for any injury affecting property held by it in a proprietary
capacity, not just for injuries relating to property held by it in a business
capacity. For another, the Court suggests both that "private citizens" can
combine their interests in a class action and that, subject to the require-
ments of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a state may
bring a class action on behalf of "some or all of its consumer citizens."
L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 771 n.3 (1977) (citations omitted).
For a view that the Hawaii Court. used "commercial interests" merely to distinguish
economic values from noneconomic values, see Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb
to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 374 (1976):
Whereas injury to such noneconomic values as aesthetics, conservation and
recreation has been held sufficient to support standing in a nonantitrust
context [fOotnote omitted], the Supreme Court tin Hawaii] has squarely
held that Section 4 is concerned exclusively with "commercial" injury.
Id, at 397.
97 As noted in note 96 supra, this statement by the Supreme Court that class
actions by consumer-citizens were available reflects an implicit assumption by the Court
that consumers have standing under § 4.
98
 The Court recently reiterated this concern in Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of
India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978):
The Court has noted that § 4 has two purposes: to deter violators and
deprive them of "'the fruits of their illegality,' " and to "compensate vic-
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negative consequences, such as duplicative recoveries or unduly complicated
and lengthy trials. Even where these factors have been present, as in Illinois
Brick and Hawaii, the Court has emphasized that other parties could prosecute
the violators, so its denial of the plaintiff's' standing would not weaken en-
forcement.
The policy considerations in Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, and Hawaii
strongly support the notion that consumers should be allowed to recover
damages resulting from overcharges on nonbusiness purchases. Limiting the
right to recover damages to business purchasers seriously weakens the en-
forcement potential of section 4. If a price-fixer sells directly to a consumer,
and the consumer is not allowed to sue, no one will be able to sue and the
wrongdoer will retain the fruits of his illegality." If a price-fixer sells to
businesses, however, he will be subject to treble damage suits. Thus, Reiter
produces an anomalous result: it immunizes price-fixers from liability for
damages to the extent they sell to consumers, but it does not protect price-
fixers from liability for damages to the extent they sell to businesses. This
result is inconsistent with the policy of enforcing the antitrust laws against all
violators.
Furthermore, the negative factors identified by the Supreme Court, dup-
licative recoveries and complexity of proof, are not present in consumer suits.
The target of resale price maintenance t"" is the pocketbook of the ultimate
consumer. No one except the, ultimate consumer can recover the amount of
the overcharge. Allowing consumers to sue would not lead to double recovery
of a single overcharge. Moreover, proof of damages in consumer suits chal-
lenging resale price maintenance schemes is no more theoretically complex
than proof of damages in suits brought by businesses. In both cases, it is
necessary only to compare prices before and after the alleged conspiracy, with
adjustments for changes in any other price-influencing conditions.'" Thus,
allowing overcharged consumers to sue for damages under section 4 of the
Clayton Act would promote enforcement of the antitrust laws and yet would
not involve complex trials or duplicative recoveries.
HI. ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT or 1976
Not only is the holding in Reiter—that overcharged consumers are not
injured in their property and thus lack section 4 standing—unsupported by
judicial authority and policy, but it also virtually nullifies the Antitrust Im-
tims of antitrust violations for their injuries." [citations omitted.] To deny a
foreign plaintiff injured by an antitrust violation the right to sue would
defeat these purposes. It would permit a price fixer or a monopolist. to
escape full liability for his illegal actions and would deny compensation to
certain of his victims, merely because he happens to deal with foreign cus-
tomers.
Id. at 314-15.
9" Even if a private suit for an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act forces
a violator to discontinue price-fixing, he still will have profited from his past illegal
activity.
"° See note 9 supra.
"' See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 786 (1977).
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provements Act of 1976. 102 This legislation amended the Clayton Act to
allow state attorneys general to bring actions on behalf of natural persons
injured by antitrust violations. Congress specifically intended it• to aid con-
sumers.'" If an overcharge for nonbusiness purchases is not an injury in
one's property, as the court held in Reiter, then the 1976 Act is useless. The
state as parens patriae cannot sue on behalf of citizens who have not suffered a
compensable injury.` 04 Since the 1976 Act does not allow the state to sue on
behalf of a "business entity," 105 the effectiveness of the Act under Reiter is
limited to individuals who make business-related purchases.'"
102 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). The Act was a response to the
Hawaii decision which denied parens patriae standing to the state of Hawaii to sue for
damages on behalf of its overcharged citizens.
1 U 3 H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2578.
"4 Although there is no case support for the proposition that a state may not
sue as parens patriae on behalf of citizens who lack standing as individuals, this proposi-
tion is presumed to be valid by both the Senate judiciary Committee in its Majority
Report on S. 1874 (The Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1978), S. REP. No. 934, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in CCH Trade Regulation Reports No. 339, Part II, at
16 (June  26, 1978), and by the Justice Department in an amicus memorandum submit-
ted in support of the plaintiff's position in Reiter, Memorandum for the United States
as Amicus Curiae in Support of a Petition for Rehearing with a Suggestion for Rehear-
ing En Banc, John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Grossman, Bruce
E. Fein, Attorneys, Department of Justice, at 9.
In his dissent to the denial of a rehearing in Reiter, judge Lay expressed the view
that "[t]he denial of standing to an individual consumer reduces to a nullity the parens
patriae provisions of the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 ...." 579 F.2d at 1087.
1 U 5 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(I)(B)(ii) (1976).
" 6 Both the Senate and House Judiciary Committees have drafted bills (S.
1874, The Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1978," and H.R. 11942, "Clayton Act
Amendments of 1978"), which would "permit consumers, businesses, and governments
injured by antitrust violations to recover [treble damages] whether or not they have
dealt directly with the antitrust. violator." S. REP. No. 934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1978), reprinted in CCH Trade Regulations Reports No. 339, part II, at 1 (June 26,
1978); H.R. REP. No. 1397, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in CCH Trade Regu-
lation Reports No. 345, Part II, at 1 (August 8, 1978). The Senate Committee Report
noted that the Illinois Brick rule has led to a virtual nullification of the Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976 because "parens patriae suits could not be brought in the vast
majority of the cases (i.e. where consumers are indirect purchasers from a violator)
contemplated by Congress." CCH Trade Regulations Reports No. 339, Part II, at 16
(June 26, 1978). if the sponsors of S. 1874 and H.R. 11942 intend to protect consum-
ers who make nonbusiness purchases, their legislation, if passed, will meet a similar
fate under Reiter, since these purchasers, direct or indirect, have been deemed not, to
suffer a property injury.
The House Judiciary Committee was aware of the Reiter problem and commented:
It does not matter whether the purchaser is a consumer or a business
entity. When a consumer pays more by reason of an antitrust violation, he
is injured in his "property," and may prove his injury as an indirect pur-
chaser under this bill or as a direct purchaser under section 4, 4A, or 4C.
The committee thus disapproves Weinberg v. Federated Department Stores, 426
F. Stipp. 880 (N.D. Calif. 1977) and more recently Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
Civ. No. 77-1474 (8th Cir. 1978), both holding that even direct purchasing
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In enacting the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, some legislators in-
dicated that they believed consumers had section 4 standing, but that the con-
sumers' individual claims were too small to make lawsuits worthwhile.'" Con-
gress provided specially in the 1976 Act for individual suits by consumers who
wish to bring them by allowing these individuals to "opt out" of the parens
patriae suit.'° 8
 Thus, the drafters of the 1976 Act thought that, in theory,
consumers could sue prior to the 1976 Act, but that, in practice, they could
not afford to. Although Congress intended the 1976 Act to remove the prac-
tical obstacles to consumer suits, the Reiter decision creates a theoretical obsta-
cle unknown to the legislators, and thus defeats the purpose of the 1976 Act.
CONCLUSION
While the courts must place reasonable boundaries on the class of persons
who may sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, in the
absence of controlling statutory language, courts should base their limitations
on policy grounds.'" As a policy matter, the Supreme Court has limited the
class permitted to sue to avoid duplicative recoveries and undue complexities
of proof. Permitting consumers to sue under section 4 would not involve
either of these problems and, therefore, would not undercut the Court's policy
goals. Moreover, consumer suits would promote the paramount policy behind
section 4—private antitrust enforcement. In cases of resale price mainte-
nance in consumer goods, the injured class probably consists mainly of non-
business purchasers such as the plaintiffs in Reiter. If they cannot sue for
damages, a large proportion of the damages inflicted will remain in the hands
of the defendants. In the language of Hanover Shoe, antitrust violators will
"retain the fruits of their illegality."
SUSAN M. LEONARD
consumers are unable to sue for injury to their property by reason of viola-
tions of the antitrust laws.
CCH Trade Regulation Reports No. 345, 15 (August 8, 1978).
1° ' See S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 499,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-10 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. AD! NEws
2572, 2573.
"" 15	 § I5c(b)(2) (1976).
"" For a comprehensive policy approach to antitrust standing, see Berger and
Bernstein, An Analytical Framework fir Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977). While
advocating a frank balancing of relevant policies and interest in § 4 standing decisions,
id. at 844, the authors make a distinction between antitrust standing and the scope of
protection under the antitrust laws, id. at 835, two concepts that have become blurred
in the case law. The policy against duplicative recoveries, a major concern of the
Hawaii Court, is, in the authors' opinion, "a sound policy consideration, but denial of
standing is too blunt an instrument to promote this interest sensitively." Id. at 851.
Apportionment of damages after a trial on the merits is suggested as an alternative. Id.
at 862. The authors also express misgivings about judicial denial of standing to avoid
burdening the courts with typically long and complex antitrust litigation. Id. at 854.
